Changes in capital allocation practices – ERM and organisational change  by Jabbour, Mirna & Abdel-Kader, Magdy
C
o
M
a
b
a
A
R
R
A
A
K
C
E
I
I
R
1
w
t
(
r
t
E
m
p
b
c
s
E
t
(
(
0
(Accounting Forum 39 (2015) 295–311
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Accounting Forum
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /acc for
hanges in capital allocation practices – ERM and
rganisational change
irna Jabboura, Magdy Abdel-Kaderb,∗
Management School, The University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld S10 1FL, UK
Anglia Ruskin University, Chelmsford, Essex CM1 1SQ, UK, and Cairo University, Giza, Egypt
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history:
eceived 3 April 2015
eceived in revised form 25 August 2015
ccepted 27 August 2015
vailable online 26 September 2015
eywords:
apital allocation
nterprise risk management (ERM)
nstitutional theory
nsurance
isk management change
a b s t r a c t
This paper aims to study changes in capital allocation routines following the introduction
of a new risk management system, enterprise risk management (ERM). Based on an insti-
tutional framework and empirical evidence from multiple sources in a large UK insurance
company,we evaluated the extent and nature of organisational change. ERMwas seen as an
external driver to the change in the existing routines, which in turn led to internal changes
in new capital allocation routines. The change was extreme, which signiﬁes that existing
capital allocation routines were not strong enough to deal with ERM as a key driver of
change.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
Enterprise risk management (ERM), from its insurance origins, has developed into a full-ﬂedged management function
hichhas sinceprogressed into areas of business thatwere consideredunrelated. Suchaportfolio approach to risk recognises
hat risks are interrelated and signiﬁcant beneﬁts can be achieved if risk is evaluated andmonitored on a companywide basis
De La Rosa, 2007). Thus, it takes into account all types of risk a company faces and manages the overall risks in aggregate
ather than independently. ERMdiffers fromtraditional riskmanagement. First, it identiﬁesandclassiﬁesboth the riskswhich
he companyhas informationor advantage about, and risks that the companyhasno informationor advantage about. Second,
RManalyses risk aspart of a company. Third, itmerges thevarious risks andactionsof riskmanagement intoone internal risk
anagement system (Culp, 2001;D’Arcy&Brogan, 2001). In anERMenvironment risk is treated as anopportunity formaking
roﬁt rather than something to be minimised or eliminated. If ERM is executed effectively it is a powerful management tool
ecause it can offer companies rewards including market leadership, robust growth, stock price premiums, and investor
onﬁdence (Schneier & Miccolis, 1998). The call for strengthened corporate governance and risk management, following
1ome business failures, has led to the release of ERM frameworks as a way to help companies standardising ERM. The
RM literature shows that the principal objective of ERM, as seen by insurers, is to create and improve shareholders’ value
hrough better risk-based decision making and capital allocation in order to increase the market value of equity capital
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2004). Thus, ﬁnancial institutions have developed risk management practices to address issues
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 01245 686848.
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1 Examples of ERM frameworks released are COSO (the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission) (2004a,b) and ISO 31000
2009).
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related to capital adequacy and to internal capital allocation to business units (Venter, 2004; Zanjani, 2002; Zeppetella,
2002), and hence an increasing number of insurance companies have adopted ERM principles (Acharyya, 2008; Dickinson,
2001), which seems to have brought about a signiﬁcant change in their operations. Basically, prior studies have recognised
the potential change triggered by ERM implementation in risk management routines (Meulbroek, 2002a,b; Millage, 2005;
Nocco & Stulz, 2006), and particularly capital allocation routines.2 In this regard, ERM can be seen as a change driver. Further,
risk-based capital calculationshavebeen advocated as internal representations of risk proﬁles, theusage ofwhich is expected
to add a new facet to companies’ accountability (Mikes, 2009). However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no
empirical evidence to support ERM implementation in associationwith changes in capital allocation routines. These routines
are part of the control practices within the ﬁrm.
This paper aims to study changes in capital allocation routines following the introduction of ERM. It reports our research
that consists of interviewswith ofﬁcers and staff from different levels within a single non-life insurance company, as well as
documentation on risk management strategies. We refer to this company as VC. This study aims to provide a better under-
standing of the change processes in capital allocation practices associated with ERM implementation. Further, we examine
institutional change aspects within the risk management context, and thus extend prior research through developing a pro-
cessual view of change (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Cruz, Major, & Scapens, 2009; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Seo & Creed, 2002;
Sharma, Lawrence, & Lowe, 2010). This study draws on an institutional framework to explain the ERM processes through
which changes in capital allocation routines are expected to arise. Although risk management systems are known to be
associated with changes at the institutional level, institutional theorists have not explored the change processes in the risk
management context.
It is argued that ERM implementation as an innovation in management control leads to changes in risk management
practices within companies, which when actioned can be a part of enacting and adding legitimacy to the changes of man-
agement control systems (Chenhall, 2003). Thus, risk management as a managerial practice has the power to augment or
challenge traditional management control forms (Huber & Scheytt, 2013). ERM is adopted in ﬁnancial institutions and is
set in the domain of ﬁnancial decision making and management control. The management accounting literature can help
in making sense of ERM implementation. However, exploring ERM as a facet of control and considering the changes sur-
rounding its implementation can enrich the existing body ofmanagement controls research (Mikes, 2009). Thus, we address
three research questions in this paper. First, what is the organisational impact of ERM as a new risk management system?
Second, what is the role of institutionalised risk management practices? And third, how have change agents’ actions played
a role in those change processes? The remainder of the paper consists of further ﬁve sections. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature on risk management and capital allocation. Sections 3 and 4 detail the theoretical underpinnings and the research
design, respectively. The ﬁndings are presented in Section 5. The ﬁnal section is the discussion and conclusions.
2. Risk management and capital allocation practices in the insurance industry
Traditionally, ﬁnancial institutions’ risks have been considered independent silos, with negative implications for a com-
pany’s risk management. Risk-based capital has emerged as a common currency in which all risks can be expressed. This led
to a leveraging of this concept to establish the key basis of ERM (Rao & Dev, 2006). Capital is the most expensive and impor-
tant input in production for ﬁnancial ﬁrms and has a different role in ﬁnancial institutions as compared to non-ﬁnancial
institutions. It is not considered a main source of funding for companies, but a buffer to absorb large unexpected losses,
protect depositors and other claim holders, and provide conﬁdence to external investors and rating agencies on the ﬁnancial
health and viability of the ﬁrm (Aziz & Rosen, 2004). Capital is deployed through holding a large number of ﬁnancial risk
positions that should be evaluated. In this regard, capital can be an ideal metric used to aggregate risks across different asset
classes and different risk types (Aziz & Rosen, 2004). Insurance companies have used various approaches to capital allocation
such as regulatory guidelines and marginal capital allocation. The idea of incorporating risk into capital allocation has been
in the literature since the late 1990s (Cummins, 2000; Crouhy, Galai, & Mark, 2006). The main capital allocation methods in
the literature are summarised in Appendix A. A brief analysis of those methods shows that they do not consider the wide
view of risk(s) pertaining to particular lines of business.
Researchers provided evidence that information quality directly affects capital allocation, which appears in companies’
cost of capital (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2005). They further argued that ERM is expected to improve risk informationwithin insur-
ance companies (Weiner, 1998). This supports our argument that ERM can play a major role in changing capital allocation
practices as risk is the ﬁrst factor to consider when holding and allocating capital. Companies hold capital to protect them-
selves against losses in excess of reserves for credit, interest-rate ﬂuctuations, inﬂation, economic operations, and market
risks (Weiner, 1998). Thus, any changes in risk management practices should inﬂuence the actions and practices within the
capital allocation process. Speciﬁc capital allocation practices, on the other hand, can lead tomisinformed ﬁnancial decisions
(Grundl & Schmeiser, 2007), and hence affect a ﬁrm’s value. Thus, adopting appropriate capital allocation practices should
enhance a ﬁrm’s value, which, arguably, is the ultimate objective of ERM (Nocco & Stulz, 2006).
2 Capital allocation routine refers to capital allocation practices, i.e., the ways/approaches used to allocate capital to different business units, products,
and customers as a main part of the process of proﬁtability-measurement. Thus, practices are the ways in which capital allocation is exercised.
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Changing capital allocation practices towards more risk-based ones is one side of the story, managing risk as a part of
apital allocation practice is the other side of the story. It is very important to ensure a sound risk management process
hen allocating capital in ﬁnancial institutions given that their ﬁnancial assets constitute a major part of the company’s
apital, unlike capital investment (Meulbroek, 2002a,b; Rao & Dev, 2006). Therefore, we can argue that implementing ERM,
hich is arguably a more advanced system of risk management, can facilitate a better understanding and measurement
f the aggregate risk inherent in various business activities. This in turn can lead to a more objective basis for resource
llocation and hence improve capital efﬁciency and return on equity (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011). Given that a developed
isk management system will enhance the ability to decide on investments based on a more accurate risk-adjusted rate,
ompanies are more likely to obtain beneﬁts (Meulbroek, 2002a,b). Thus, in an ERM (holistic risk) environment, the aim of
isk management can be seen as to increase returns on equity capital rather than reducing risk (Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein,
993; Strongin & Petsch, 1999).
A web-based survey by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (2004) reported that economic capital was a key decision-making tool
or insurers at all levels inaﬁrm,and riskandcapitalmanagementweremakingadifference. Insurers’ businessdecisionswere
lso found to be guided by enhanced risk and capital management approaches as a result of using them more broadly at the
ompany level (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2004). Another survey by AON (2010)3 showed that 57 per cent of the responding
ompanies embed risk management within the capital allocation process. The survey provided evidence that companies
ith well-developed ERM systems were able to better manage the process of capital allocation. In contrary, companies in
he early stage of ERM implementation did not use ERM for capital allocation process. As such, ERM is expected to affect
apital allocation practices when its implementation develops over time. Further, a risk-constrained optimisation approach
as employed by Ai, Brockett, Cooper, and Golden (2011) to study capital allocation decisions under ERM. They holistically
reated the issue of managing enterprise-wide risks via maximising the expected total return on capital while trading off
isks in Value-at-Risk sort of constraints.
The above review shows that prior studies addressing the relationship between ERM implementation and capital alloca-
ion practices have mainly adopted a positivistic perspective. There is an absence of empirical evidence on how ERM rules
odify or change capital allocation routines. It is necessary to go beyond isomorphism and symbolic conformity to stress
ctors and practices, and the relationship of institutional forces to micro-processes (Burns, 2000; Lounsbury, 2008; Sharma
t al., 2010; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005; Soin, Seal, & Cullen, 2002). This study addresses this gap in the literature.
. Institutional framework
Different institutional approaches have been adopted to analyse management accounting practices. Studies informed by
ld institutional economics (OIE) provided evidence on how management accounting practices change (Burns, 2000; Burns
Scapens, 2000; Coad and Cullen, 2006; Lukka, 2007; Quinn, 2013; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005; Soin et al., 2002). However,
hey exhibit a taken-for-granted nature. New institutional sociology (NIS) has been used to explain the change in manage-
ent accounting that is due to external pressures such as regulatory changes (Collier, 2001; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & Gonzalez,
006). Further, rules and routines concepts have been adopted in a number of studies (Burns, 2000; Burns & Scapens, 2000;
uinn, 2011; Van der Steen, 2009, 2011). Our study focuses on the micro-processes of change in management accounting,
articularly riskmanagement practices within a single insurance company. New institutional sociology theory (NIS) consid-
rs extra-organisational institutions like social, economic, and political institutions which exist in the organisational ﬁeld
nd society. Further, new institutional economics (NIE) is not appropriate to use in this research because our main focus
s the intra-organisational process of change driven by institutions and rules that already exist in the organisational ﬁeld
ather than determining whether institutions exist based on underlying economic theory, whichmakes NIE out of the scope
f this study.
As such, old institutional economics (OIE) is deemed most suited to this study. This institutional economics stream pro-
oses actors’ tastes and preferences should be treated as socially conditioned not as given preference functions, which is
ot consist with NIE assumptions of rational, maximising behaviour by agents with given and stable preference functions
Hodgson, 1998). Thus, institutionalists rejected the use of given preference functions to model individuals. Thus, OIE dis-
ards the assumptions of neo-classical economics related to rational economic man and equilibrium-based theorising. The
nteraction between individuals forms institutions, but individuals’ purposes/preferences are also shaped by socio-economic
onditions (Hodgson, 1998). OIE further assumes that tastes and preferences of individuals need to be analysed in relation
o their effect on both action and behaviour. As such, rules, norms and routines are argued to have an impact on tastes
nd preferences (Hodgson, 1998). Institutional theorists (Barley & Tolbert, 1997) have mainly addressed how institutional
tructure and agency exercised by actors inﬂuence each other (Sharma et al., 2010). However, they have been quiet about
he use of institutional theory within the risk management ﬁeld. Thus, more research is needed using institutional theory
o address the mechanisms playing a role in choosing speciﬁc risk management rules and routines, and the circumstances
nder which risk ofﬁcials affect institutional change. In this study, we aim to ﬁnd out how speciﬁc institutional forces (ERM
ules here) can affect the choice of changing/modifying capital allocation routines at the institutional level. In this respect,
RM and the related actions of the risk management team can be conceptualised as an agent of change.
3 Twelve per cent of the survey respondents were from the ﬁnancial industry.
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Institutional theory is used in this case study because it is traditionally considered as a theory of stability and hence
there is a need to extend it to incorporate changes (Sharma et al., 2010). This study is based on Burns and Scapens’ (2000)
institutional model as it takes into account management accounting change within individual ﬁrms (intra-organisational
processesof change),which is theaimof this study. Institutional theoryhas informedstudies onchanges inbothmanagement
accounting andmanagement control systems ﬁelds (Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Goretzki, Strauss, &Weber, 2013; Sharma
et al., 2010). However, it has not been used in the risk management ﬁeld and speciﬁcally not in relation to ERM although
there is little doubt that riskmanagement systems are generally associated with changes at the institutional level. However,
institutional theoryusagehas been criticised. For example, using institutional theory to address changeprocesseswas seen to
have a tendency to ignore agency (Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007). Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework can help overcome
this problem because of its focuses on agents’ actions (see Fig. 1). Further, DiMaggio (1988) argued that power and group
interests are smuggled into the institutional perspective at the expense of sustained theoretical objectivity.
Fig. 1 presents the theoretical processes of capital allocation routinisation at VC, and is based on Burns and Scapens’
(2000) institutional model. Speciﬁc behaviours are expected to dissociate from their historical circumstances throughout
the institutionalisation process of capital allocation routines. As such, rules and routines become the way things are: i.e.,
institutions. ERM rules can allow for the deinstitutionalisation of prior institutions and the introduction of new rules and
routines through the processes of enactment, reproduction, and institutionalisation (Burns & Scapens, 2000). Actors’ actions
lead to changes in rules and routines through those processes. Those institutions will be encoded into the on-going rules
and routines and will form new rules, and so on. In this regard, institutions are the structural properties comprising the
assumptions regarding theway of doing things that are taken for granted. They shape and restrict the rules and routines, and
decide the individual actors’meanings, norms, values, and powers (Burns& Scapens, 2000). Rules and routines concepts have
been adopted to analyse management control practices (Quinn, 2011; Van der Steen, 2009, 2011), but not risk management
practices. Thus, this study can be considered as a speciﬁc application of Burns and Scapens’ model to the analysis of risk
management change. Any change inmanagement accounting canbe interpretedusingphenomena such as rules and routines
enabling and constraining actions, and risk management change is no exception. Drawing on OIE, Burns and Scapens (2000)
suggest three dichotomies: formal versus informal change, that is, conscious design as against tacit change; revolutionary
versus evolutionary change, or in other words, fundamental disruption as opposed to gradual change; and regressive versus
progressive change, that is, ceremonial as opposed to instrumental change.
Fig. 1. Theoretical framework.
Adapted from Burns and Scapens (2000, p. 9).
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The concept of organisational routines will be drawn upon in our study to interpret micro-level riskmanagement change
n an insurance company. Burns and Scapens (2000) deﬁned rules as ‘the formalised statement of procedures’, and routines
s ‘the procedures actually in use’ (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 7). ‘Rules are normally changed only at discrete intervals; but
outines have the potential to be in a cumulative process of change as they continue to be reproduced’ (Burns & Scapens,
000, p. 7). Change, according to Burns and Scapens (2000), is slow, longer-term, and evolutionary over a long period of
ime, but they recognise that it can occur in response to internal organisational processes. However, they also argue that
evolutionary changemostly stems fromexternal causes. As such, our study conceptualises ERM implementation as an event
or structuration, which is consistent with what is called ‘the cumulation of events deriving from an initiating circumstance
ithout which that cumulation would not have been found’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 13).
Even though we follow Burns and Scapens’ (2000) deﬁnition of routines in this study, we recognise that there is a need
o go beyond the simplistic view of routines4 (Pentland, 2011; Pentland & Feldman, 2005, 2008). Rules and routines are
xpected to have material aspects (Volkoff et al., 2007) alongside ostensive and performative aspects (Feldman & Pentland,
003). This is beyond the scope of this paper as we focus more on the argument that change can be brought about by shocks
o companies (Burns & Scapens, 2000). Even though dynamics capabilities are featured, ‘organisations often have to cope
ith problems they are not well prepared for’ (Winter, 2003, p. 992). This notion is an essential starting point in the story
f new/changed capital allocation routines at VC. As such, it is necessary to identify the actual routine’s change processes
encoding, enacting, reproduction, and institutionalisation) before we examine the internal dynamics of those routines.
The institutional framework informing this study offers the theoretical basis to explain the extent towhich ERM environ-
ent shapes the behaviours of different actors, and to analyse howandwhy change agentsmodify and transformcapital allo-
ation routines, and ultimately the whole company. This institutional framework outlines a suitable way to study organisa-
ional changes following the instructionof ERMwithinVC. First, this framework is a sequentialmodel,which analytically sep-
rates the institutions synchronic effects on actions fromthe actions’ diachronic effects on institutions. Such separation facili-
ates theexaminationof changeprocesses fromthe introductionofnewrules as anaction,which is formedbyexisting institu-
ions to the institutionalisation of such rules. Second, the routines concept, as programmatic rule-based behaviours, provides
he connection explaining how the new rules turn out to be institutions over time (Kholeif, Abdel-Kader, & Sherer, 2008).
. Research design
.1. The case company (VC)
Due to the lack of empirical research on the change in capital allocation routines driven by ERM in the insurance sector,
nd the need to investigate such change, an explanatory case study methodology (Ryan, Scapens, & Theobald, 1992) has
een chosen for this study. The selection of this speciﬁc company was made for two main reasons. First, it is a large global
nsurance company. Prior accounting research emphasises that ﬁrm size is an explanatory factor for the emergence and
se of management control systems (Haka, Gordon, & Pinches, 1985; Myers, Gordon, & Hamer, 1991; Shields, 1995) and is
ositively related to ERM adoption and use (Beasley, Clune, & Hermanson, 2005; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011). Second, ERM is
onsidered by the company ofﬁcers to be mature and fully implemented across the company. This was also obvious in the
nnual reports. A mature ERM helps when considering all the aspects of ERM throughout its evolution. Interviewees came
rom almost all departments and worked at different levels (both senior and non-senior). They were those who have risk
esponsibilities and use ERM in their day-to-day work. This helped in covering various views on ERM and the way it has
een used by different people and at different levels.
VC was founded in the late 18th century as a general insurance company with various lines of business. It is one of the
argest insurance groups in theworld. A large number of ofﬁces are situated across Europe, the USA, and Asia. The company is
eputable as a leading commercial insurer. It has gained this reputation because of its solid underwriting expertise, ﬁnancial
trength, and excellent security rating. VC showed a sustainable growth through good management that takes into consid-
ration all social, environmental and economic aspects. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rated the company highly for its ﬁnancial
trength. Such a high rating and assessment indicates the company’s ﬁnancial security in terms of its ability tomeet ﬁnancial
ommitments and contractual obligations. Various services and strategies are conducted by a professional team to address
xposures and provide efﬁcient solutions. These services provide a great help to the company’s risk managers in assessing
he risks portfolio, and allocating premiums and budgets for risk improvements based on possible loss expectancies. The
ompany’s risk managers have Internet based access to all the information provided by their team, which assists in moni-
oring risk improvements. Training programmes concerning loss prevention are continuously carried out in the company to
nhance the awareness of loss prevention and to assist corporate risk managers in carrying out risk management activities..2. Data collection
The case company was visited over a period of 14 months between 2011 and 2012. Multiple data collection methods,
emi-structured interviews and documentary evidence, were used to get a rich set of data and to capture the contextual
4 Riskmanagement routines can be approached as a unit of analysiswhereby there is a need to study their internal dynamicswhendesigning ormanaging
hem within an ERM environment (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2005).
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complexity (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). Notes were taken during the interviews and more detailed notes were
written up as soon as possible following each interview. Interviews are considered as a fundamental source of case study
evidence because generally case studies are about human relationships or behavioural events. Signiﬁcant insights into such
relationships or events canbeprovidedbywell-informed interviewees.However, interviews are considered as verbal reports
only. Therefore, the interviewees’ responses are exposed to the general problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate
articulation. To minimise the effect of such problems, we corroborated interview data with other internal and publicly
available sources of data (Yin, 2009).
The internal company documents accessed included ERM polices and framework documents, business plans, operating
performance records, a CFO report, management analysis reports, and documents concerning training programmes. Some
other computerised processes were accessed at the company at the time of the interviews. Reference to publicly available
data such as annual reports and the company’s published information was made. Such triangulation of data sources helped
improve the internal validity of the research. Access to VC employees and documents was very good. However, some doc-
uments such as the corporate plan were considered to be highly conﬁdential and were available to us only in redacted
form. VC’s annual reports helped us understand the history of such a large insurance company and facilitated the plan for
interviews as well as the analysis.
Fifteen face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2012 with a number of ofﬁcers and
staff fromdifferent levelswithin thecompany (seeAppendixA). The initial accesswas thecompany’sCRO,whowas interested
in our research and helped by putting us in contact with other ofﬁcers, and they in turn put us in contact with people from
variousdepartments in the company (a snowballing approach). Each interview lasted for anhouronaverage andwasdigitally
recorded; then they were subsequently transcribed and validated by the interviwees. The interviews were conducted in the
employee’s ofﬁce or the company’s meeting rooms. The questions asked were directed to get detailed information on prior
capital allocation routines aswell as the new capital allocation routines following ERM implementation and embedding. The
interview schedulewas prepared to suit the role and background (with regard to risk) of each participant. In each subsequent
interview, some issues were added to the interview schedule. These issues provided the main basis on which to determine
whether additional explanation was needed in the following interview.
4.3. Data analysis
The analysis of the interviews transcripts began by reducing the transcripts to exclude any irrelevant data. This enabled
in-depth analysis of the ﬁrst stage of forming the ﬁeld. Then, we followed coding and veriﬁcation procedures to help us to
comprehend the data. Thus, the transcripts data were coded according to categories that were pre-deﬁned in the theoretical
framework that is: institutions, rules, routines, and actions at the level of VC. However, we identiﬁed new categories such
as: routine internal dynamics, which were included in the ﬁnal coding. The text was then coded using Nvivo5 and manual-
coding according towhat resembles institutions, rules, routines, and actions; where they exist (ﬁeld or organisational level);
at what point in time the change took place; andwho/what led this change. The coding progressed following the procedures
suggested for qualitative research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The ﬁrst analysis of data identiﬁed that the institutional
change took place following ERM implementation and key changes, speciﬁcally in capital allocation routines, occurred as
ERM become more mature, while the risk department played the main role in enacting the risk management rules. Using
qualitative coding and analysis software facilitated the process of identifying themes in the data, categorising them, and
representing them in network diagrams. In order to verify the validity of our interpretations, debrieﬁngwas donewhere the
transcripts and a brief analysis were sent to the interviewees to get their feedback, as well as viewing and analysing internal
and publically sources of information and extracting the relevant information. Then we compared it to what interviewees
expressed. These procedures helped in conﬁrming the results generated from the interviews.
Data analysis thenmoved to the next stagewhere the change in capital allocation routines took place (2006/2007), which
represented an institutional change process. Following Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Yin (2009), the data was synthesised
by identifying the relevant themes and concepts including encoding, enactment, reproduction, and institutionalisation.
Further, the use of axial and selective coding helped us detecting emergent themes that were linked to speciﬁc categories,
connecting the categories to each other, summarising the categories into various themes, and reﬁning them in relation to
explanatory concepts. Such process allowed the comparisonwith previous research ﬁndings and helpedmaking connections
with existing theory.
5. Findings: production and reproduction of capital allocation routines (actions and routines)
Burns and Scapens’ (2000) model suggests identifying three key elements: organisational routines and habits, an insti-
tutional realm, and a realm of action. Our analysis of the institutional realm shows that there are highly regulated set
of institutions outside insurance companies, which were mirrored by institutions and routines within VC. However, the
unit of analysis in our study is the underwriting department within VC. Thus, the immediate institutional realm is not the
5 Even though the data analysis process was supported by using Nvivo software for textual analysis, it was a helping hand tool as the researchers felt
more comfortable referring to the actual transcripts. Nvivo facilitated the process through applying mapping techniques when structuring the data.
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nstitutions outside VC but the inﬂuence of other departments in VC, especially its risk management system. Moving to
he action realm, we found that VC responded to increased competition through improving its risk management system
y having a more holistic approach as outlined in the company’s objectives. The adoption and implementation of ERM in
C started in 2002, but stronger ERM activities and risk management routines were developed in the last six years. ERM
doption occurred at a speciﬁc time, whereby risk management systems were deinstitutionalised from their historical cir-
umstances. Traditional risk management systemswere replaced by a new holistic approach to risk management; ERM. The
raditional systems basically focused on operational risk, whilst underwriting risk (or credit risk) was managed by the Chief
nderwriter and CFO. However, ERM embedding was a long process that evolved over time. Furthermore, the company’s
ocuments indicated that VC establishes its own basic principles for risk management and keeps all risks associated with
arrying out its business under control by having a department responsible for risk management. All the company’s risks
re managed through processes of the speciﬁcation, evaluation, and control of risks; contingency plans; monitoring; and
eporting. Necessary adjustments are made according to the particular nature of speciﬁc risks. Principles for integrated risk
anagement are established and quantitative riskmanagement is conducted, with the aim ofmaintaining credit ratings and
reventing bankruptcies. The size of the risk management and actuarial departments has been increased and specialised
eople were recruited to embed ERM following its adoption. Therefore, ERM implementation was assigned to an internal
eam drawn from VC’s own staff alongside newly recruited risk-specialised staff. The ERM team consisted of one person
the CRO) when the adoption decision was made, and then a risk team was developed from 2004/2005 to carry out ERM
mplementation and embedding.
ERM is considered as an action that encodes institutional principles at VC. It formed the context out of which new risk
anagement routines emerged. Thus, there have been various changes in capital allocation routines. ERM embedding was
ollowed by an accumulated change, over six years, in the capital allocation routines enacted by VC. Encoding the new ERM
ules (that is frameworks and policies) allowed for the deinstitutionalisation of old capital allocation institutions and the
ntroduction of new capital allocation routines. The following subsections explain the encoding, enactment, reproduction,
nd intra-institutional processes of these routines.
.1. Encoding and enactment of capital allocation routines
The literature suggests that ERM implementation occurs ﬁrst and this is followedby changes in capital allocation routines.
his path dependency process was evident in the VC case. Introducing ERM rules and their related subsequent actions was
trigger for micro-processes of change in capital allocation routines, as it tended to routinise new routines. ERM did not
upport existing capital allocation routines (see Section 5.2). This is because ERM’s built-in knowledge has been transferred
o its users; speciﬁcally, the people responsible for capital allocation. Further actions were taken by VC following ERM
mbedding to improve its risk reporting structure. The wider risk communication enacted by ERM, within a risk reporting
tructure, enabled VC to achieve a consistent and appropriate risk response. As argued by Woods (2011), this approach
nables risk management activities to fully support the achievement of the strategic objectives of the ﬁrm.
From the interviews and documentary materials it was evident that the formation of the Risk Management Department
RMD) was the trigger to facilitate the introduction of new capital allocation routines as a part of the enactment of ERM
ules. However, it was a process of change, not a static point at which the new rules were introduced. The CRO and the
isk management team started the enactment process by deﬁning all the basic structures, including frameworks and poli-
ies, which should be considered on daily basis. One difﬁculty faced the risk management team in introducing the new
ules of capital allocation was to get staff to learn how to adopt them. Thus, an educational and training programme was
stablished to support and push the process of enacting capital allocation routines. The CEO and CFO provided the ﬁnancial
upport to complete this process of change. For example, one of the training programmes centred on how to become an
RM underwriter. All underwriters in VC were required to complete this programme. Although underwriters still want to
aximise proﬁt, now they have to look at the wider implications of their underwriting decisions and how much capital will
e consumed.
“If I said for example that I want my preferred mix of business to be 20 per cent marine, 20 per cent property, 20 per
cent liability, 20 per cent PA and however you may want to do that. And then actually what I end up writing is 50 per
cent of it as property but I still get to my overall premium plan number, is that OK? Actually it is not OK because by
writing a lot more property business, I am probably going to consume a lot more capital.” (EOO)
The risk information needed to allocate capitalwithin ERMvaries and has to be sourced fromdifferent departments in VC.
lthough the RMD is the main source of risk registry, which helps actuaries run the capital model, the information related
o underwriting risk was provided by the Underwriting Department. Expert judgement also played a role in providing risk
nformation, which was built on historical and market information. Reserving and market risk information was provided by
he Finance Department. The multiple sources of risk information and coordination among different departments to enact
he new capital allocation routines provide evidence that risk management has become holistic and embedded across all
epartments in VC. It was evident that people have started to use ERM in their day-to-day activities and to communicate
ith people from other departments.
ERM is not an arcane theory, but has practical applications. The general belief in VC was that ERMwill make the business
ealthier and better managed. The new capital allocation routines have become more rigorous because ERM provided a
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well-structured framework and governance. This framework encoded rules, which encompass considering capital allocation
routines by staff and getting an efﬁcient allocation. The output of the ERM process helped VC determine where its business
should go in the future. EOO explained:
“. . . say different lines of business consume different amount of capital. So what is the optimummix for our business?
Maybe we don’t have that today but we can plan towards where we want to be three/four/ﬁve-year time. Again if we
have growth plan, do we have a desire to grow by let’s say 10 per cent per annual over the next few years. Do we have
the capital resources to do that? If we grow in different ways what are the implications of that. Our model gives us a
lot of valuable outputs to help us think hard about strategy and shape our strategy.” (EOO)
Some interviewees have explained how information generated from the ERM is used to decide which line of business
to grow or which line of business to reduce, as well as a sort of early warning system in assessing the performance of VC’s
business lines. Following ERM embedding, an internal capital model was developed to quantify howmuch capital needed to
be held above best estimates in order to provide conﬁdence in capital decisions. When setting VC business plans, the capital
model is used to identify the lines of business that provide a good return compared to the risk they take as well as the lines
providing a return that is not good relative to the risk they take.
“. . . within capital allocation you’ll have to have what is classiﬁed as reserving risk, so because I do the reserving and
mywork is extended into howmuch risks are there behind, have I got the reserves right or wrong. So then I’ll ﬁt it into
capital. The capital is then determined for each of the classes of business, it uses the reserves that I have calculated.
So if I’ve got the reserves wrong, the CA might be too high or too low.” (AA/1)
ERM implementation was a top-down approach and was strongly pushed to the extent that people knew that they
were obliged to learn about it. To support this, communication across the company has been improved and become well
documented. This offered a stronger base for controlling all the risks facing VC and thus led to a better allocation of capital.
However, this process was accompanied by many different documents which were sometimes very difﬁcult to understand
and resulted in an overload of information.
“. . . in the claims department you hear it from yourmanager, from the top people. But, the problemwe have is almost
like a bit of information overload. We’ve got a lot of documents. We’ve got a lot of ERM polices and sub polices for all
the different risk categories. We’ve also got business continuity management policies, and lots of manuals supporting
these.Many of our documents aremandatory for staff to read, so can you imagine if you receivemany large documents
to read, at some point you would turn off, it doesn’t matter what it is.” (RM/1)
5.2. Reproduction of capital allocation routines
Prior to ERM, capital allocation inVCwasbasedonaﬁxedpercentageof thepremium. That is, therewasno risk assessment
in allocating capital. The use of ERM has led to what can be considered a revolutionary change in capital allocation routines.
Staff have to think more realistically as they have become more aware of their capital requirements. Therefore, there is a
larger chance that peoplewill be able to identify potential risks in advance of any damaging effects on capital. As such VC has
started to use the risk-based capital allocation method. It was claimed that using this speciﬁc method led to a higher return
on capital as it gave a greater understanding of the risks to which the company is exposed, and hence capital is allocated
particularly to individual exposures. Understanding different types of risk in more detail can enhance capital allocation
routines. This change has been to a more process-oriented decision-making practice. However, it was ultimately affecting
the ﬁnancial decision because of ERM outputs. The CUO stated:
“. . . we have to think about what kind of a change has happened in the market and we have to amend the expected
ﬁgures. Then decide the direction we should go and what kind of resource we need.” (CUO)
A smaller buffer was experienced with more conﬁdence regarding capital decisions and a higher return on capital was
achieved after embedding ERM rules. In this regard, it was believed that extra beneﬁts were offered to both shareholders
and employees.
“. . . I think before having the model our buffer is much bigger. But for the sake of I like to sleep well in the bed, okay
so let’s put 50 per cent buffer. Now we are much more conﬁdent about our necessity of the capital itself so the buffer
should be smaller”. (CUO)
Understanding the risks inherent in the company and providing the right data allow for an assessment of the level of
capital needed to balance the expected risks.
“It [ERM] should allow the Company to reduce the amount of guessing needed to allocate capital and, instead, base it
on amore robustmethodology. You can say if you use the correctmodels and the right techniqueswithin your internal
model, you can be a lot more speciﬁc and have a lot more conﬁdence in the capital allocation. So when your model
says you need £80 million of capital, you can have a good level of conﬁdence that this truly reﬂects the exposure that
the Company faces.” (RM/2)
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ERM structure and culture have offered a better understanding of why there is a need to do the work in a speciﬁc way.
n particular, following ERM, underwriters have a clear responsibility for providing the most relevant possible information
nd the new routines have supported this by providing a higher quality data. The EOO stated:
“. . . The underwriters must understand that they are responsible to the quality of the data, the accuracy of the data,
the completeness of the data. Again what does that mean? Well, actually if we have got incomplete data that means
we can’t model out our CAT risk. If we can’t model out our CAT risk then we are aware that this is a big deﬁciency and
probably that means we have to hold more capital and the rate of return we need become lower.” (EOO)
The RMD gets staff involved in discussions and also participates with groups. They rehearse tasks and perform tests to
nsure that staff understand what is asked of them. They also give feedback to staff at lower levels. However, it transpired
hat staff needed much more time to absorb the changes enacted by ERM and that the change was a learning process that
nvolved mistakes and corrections until ERM had time to develop.
“Themore people become involved themore questions people are asking. So if people are asking questions it’s helping
them to understand but also the Risk Department maybe question even more and more different things, therefore
they can sort of recognise risk much earlier. We’ve got the risk register which is ﬁlled in and updated daily. And if it’s
been changed they send an e-mail to the whole company so we all know it’s been changed and we should all go and
read it. We should try and understand why it’s been changed. And they’ve certainly, from when I’ve been here, it’s
become much more apparent how important ERM to the company” (AA/1)
Maximising the efﬁciency of capital use is considered as a key challenge for VC after using ERM. This conﬁrms the
igniﬁcant effect ERM has on capital allocation in the insurance industry. The high rating by S&P is seen to be coming from
he capital strands as they imply the strength of VC’s riskmanagement and capitalmanagement processes. Capital allocation
s monitored and reviewed to decide whether to take more risks and what kind of proﬁts can be made.
.3. Intra-institutionalisation of capital allocation routines
As explained earlier, the introduction of risk-based capital allocation evolved as a result of using ERM and was not
mposed by the management. In this regard, it represents a routine in that it is a procedure actually in use. This is evident
y running ERM training programmes, which are tailored to suit different departments’ requirements. This supported the
nstitutionalisation of the new capital allocation routines. Efforts were also directed to facilitate the use of risk-based capital
llocation routines following the embedding of ERM. This was evident in introducing fundamental changes to the risk and
apital information available to staff. Furthermore, different understandings and beliefswere shaped about capital allocation
outines following ERM implementation. For example, capital allocation was redirected to aim for a higher return on capital
nstead of higher proﬁts. Risk management was the core of this process as capital allocation has become the basis for the
uantiﬁcation of the company’s risk. The process of deciding what type of business to write (or not to write) has become
ased on the associated risks that is included in the new capital allocation routines. Within VC the people responsible for
apital allocation have started to think in terms of howmuch capital they will need to growwithout signiﬁcantly increasing
heir risks. Thus, it is affecting the underwriters’ ways of thinking. They now understand the interaction of capital in the
ecisions they make and the effect of their decisions on the capital.
One particular problemwas experienced in the capital allocation process because of the lack of the software that supports
he need for having risk information and the access to real-time information alongside historical data. CRO and CAc asked
or new software that relies on the new ERM strategy. This was facilitated by the ﬁnancial support from the CEO and the
FO. The new software was installed shortly after the introduction of risk-based routines and included an internal model
o allocate capital in a more detailed fashion and to all segments of the business. It was believed that decision making with
egard to capital allocation processes has improved and the embedding of ERM rules played a major role in providing the
ecessary information it needs. It is sufﬁcient to recognise that although the basic concept of linking capital to risk has been
ecognised for a long time, the evolution to capital models is far more recent. The internal capital model was put in action as
key strategic and operational decision making tool, which enabled the company to integrate the process of both risk and
apital management. The output of the internal model has been systematically used to manage the daily business. Then the
ompany has monitored the capital needed to support its business plans. VC has thought about enhancing such a strategy
ecause itmayhelp achieving bettermanagement systems and bring about amore efﬁcient usage of resources. This indicates
hat the capital model has becomemuchmore of an integrated part of the business, which facilitates the institutionalisation
f those routines.
Interviewees realised the need for adopting ERMpractices as a key part of VC’s internal capital models and thus its capital
llocation routines. Because VC has become more capital oriented, seeking to improve its return on capital, a quantitative
spect was added to the qualitative aspect in the risk management process. The quantitative aspect is now a main part of
ow the outputs of the internal model guide VC in terms of where to grow, downsize, or modify its business. In particular,
ehaviours of and tools for underwriters have been reengineered over the year that followed practicing risk-based capital
llocation in the Underwriting Department. This shows how ‘routines have the potential to be in a cumulative process of
hange as they continue to be reproduced’ (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 7). As a part of the institutionalisation process, speciﬁc
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statements were introduced at particular intervals providing detailed information on what underwriters should and should
not do, and which tools they are required to use and how to use them. Therefore, risk-based capital allocation has become
a rule in the sense that it became the formalised statement of procedures at discrete intervals. Thus, the way underwriters’
work has changed. This was further documented to include elements of ERM in the new capital allocation routines. This led
to changing staff’s understanding throughout the business, including those responsible for capital allocation, as now they
have a clearer picture and better understand the concepts related to what they are doing.
Institutionalisation canbeviewed in termsof theactions related toorganising thedocumentary cycle and thuseliminating
duplication of work and offering staff easier and quicker access to information. Underwriters have started to document their
processes to clearly and easily identify gaps and risks when looking at these documents. This means that they reported risks
and looked clearly at the mitigation circumstances that surrounded it more efﬁciently and effectively.
“. . . So to be direct, decisionmaking is fast and allocate the capital is adjusted too tomonitor the performance.” (CUO)
Particular evidence for the institutionalisation of the new risk-based capital allocation in VC was that the staff believed
therewill be no further change to this approach. Staff are content about the efﬁciency of this new capital allocation approach
and not expecting any further changes. For example, AA/1 stated:
“So as your data becomesmore accurate aswell, it’s going to be very difﬁcult to argue against the risk-based approach.
So I think as time goes on, yes, they may ﬁnd other ways of doing things, but I still don’t think it’ll change risk-based I
think that’s that is best measure they have.” (AA/1)
However, there is always the possibility for changing and improving capital allocation methods in the case of emergence
of new innovations and/or regulatory requirements in the future.
6. Discussion and conclusions
This study investigated changes in capital allocation routines following the introduction of ERM. Our analysis was
informed by an institutional framework, and this analysis started with the identiﬁcation of the intra-institutional realms
and the initial set of rules and routines characterising the VC’s riskmanagement. Further, the realm of actionwas analysed to
identify themain actors in the new risk environment and their relationshipswith the institutional realm. Having established
risk-based capital allocation as new risk management routine, we aimed at exploring the effect of an external factor (ERM)
on existing routines (see Fig. 2). As stated earlier, OIE, and particularly Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework, proved to be
most suited to understanding and explaining the micro-processes of change in risk management practices within a single
insurance company. Burns and Scapens’ (2000) model proposed a number of ways to track and evaluate the organisational
change. Referring to Fig. 1, it seems that the CROand risk teamwere themain actors in the process of encoding newprinciples
from the institutional realm (step a). The riskmanagement team alongside the risk sponsors were involved in the enactment
process (step b). Those teams did not participate in a ‘one shot’ change in work process, but participated in setting up new
routines, which would reproduce themselves and feedback to the institutional realm through reﬂexive monitoring. Thus
only ERM could reproduce (step c) and institutionalise practices (step d). Encoding, enactment, and reproduction are con-
tinuing processes introducing the new ERM rules. As such, capital allocation process has become routinised in a consistent
manner as explained by Burns and Scapens (2000). Consequently, it can be argued that other theories including NIS, and
NIE are not appropriate to explain the change studied by this research. The main concern of such theories is not particularly
related to the understanding of the intra-organisational processes of change.
As noted by scholars such as Burns and Scapens (2000), change can be brought about by shocks to organisations. Although
referring to dynamics capabilities, ‘organisations often have to cope with problems they are not well prepared for’ (Winter,
2003, p. 992) is a good startingpoint in the storyof new(andchanged) capital allocation routines atVC. In this regard, ERMcan
be theorised as a system that has different facets interacting together in theprocess of changeundertakenby companies. ERM
was initiated as an action encompassing a combination of hardware and software within the realm of action. This initiating
circumstance generated consequent events that cumulated over time to develop ERM as a holistic approach and hence an
institutional force. Those events were essentially derived from ERM acting as rule and as an agent of change. ERM rules were
theorised in the form ofwritten frameworks and policies (artefacts) as a part of forming ERMbasic structure, which encoded
and enacted speciﬁc mechanisms of working shaping risk management routines as organisational routines. Therefore, the
day-to-day risk management practices were re-shaped to a large extent by routines. Risk management routines in turn
affected ERM rules because the established routines were formalised in new rules, i.e. risk-based capital allocation. As such,
ERM rules and risk management routines are not related in a unidirectional way, and hence ERM can shape and be shaped
by the institutions governing insurance companies, which is consistent with Burns and Scapens (2000).
Those teams also had interrelated roles in this process, which raised the dialectic of control issue. One action was to
get staff to attend intensive training. This training is directed to explain ERM process, staff’s risk responsibilities, and the
necessity of taking these speciﬁc responsibilities as a part of ERM embedding. Such training can also be seen as a tool to
communicate a clear understandingof responsibilities,which shouldhelp to avoid someconﬂict caused as a result of dialectic
of control. Discussion with some interviewees revealed that continuous internal training programmes improved their risk
management education and helped them to understand the impacts of ERM implementation.
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Routine changehasbeendiscussed in theaccounting literatureusingBurns andScapens’ (2000)model, butnot speciﬁcally
n ERM environment. The establishment of risk-based capital allocation as a new risk management routine led us to explore
he effect of an external factor (ERM, in our case) on existing routines. In order to further evaluate organisational change
ur interpretations can beneﬁt from Burns and Scapens (2000) study where they refer to three dichotomies: formal versus
nformal change, evolutionary versus revolutionary change, and progressive versus regressive change.
.1. Formal versus informal change
The encoding and enacting processes of change featured both formal and informal changes at VC. For example, the risk
fﬁcials promoted a risk culture informally and led other staff to think in a way consistent with ERM. All staff across the
ompany started to appreciate risk data more because they were derived from actual technical knowledge rather than non-
lear allocations. This is consistent with Bhimani and Piggott (1992) who found that a better appreciation for accounting
nformation was developed in their case. More speciﬁcally, underwriters at VC are seen to rediscover a technical knowledge
ase that had been missing prior to ERM implementation. However, some staff exercised resistance to the new system
nd this was managed by setting up a risk management department with clear roles and responsibilities. Organisational
esistance in the enactment of rules and routines could affect the change extent and type. ‘Unconscious/unintended change
ay occur in the absence of systems to monitor the execution of the routines and where the rules and routines are not
ufﬁciently understood and/or accepted by the actors’ (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 10). The new department has supported all
RM-related actions and managed staff resistance. It was also essential to run non-compulsory ERM training programmes,
hich supported risk embedding into capital allocation routines. Afterwards,more formal compulsory training programmes
ere put in place. It was not surprising that underwriting and Actuarial Departments used ERMmore extensively than other
epartments because they mainly exercise capital allocation routines. At the same time, the risk function was given the
ppropriate authority (power) to run ERM implementation and embedding processes, and moved from being the CFO’s
esponsibility to the CEO’s. Further, forming a risk committee (which included a number of chief ofﬁcers who have risk
esponsibilities) and/or appointing a risk coordinator in every department illustrates how ERM was made the responsibility
f everyone across the company. ERMenabled the risk department to provide risk ofﬁcials, and particularly the underwriting
eam, with both qualitative and quantitative data on all types of risks that affects business lines and capital allocation
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processes and activities. The risk team put large efforts into ensuring that their risk data is as precise as possible, which
added credibility to their outputs. The perceptions of underwriters and actuaries were that risk information is now more
reliable and precise rather than being the result of personal judgement only. ERM has altered the organisational reality for
underwriters and actuaries by providing a new set of risk categories and toolswithwhich individuals can order and structure
their world. The reality was not just about using a different method to capital allocation, but also on greater understanding
of capital allocation processes. The participation of staff at different levels in the implementation and embedding of ERM
has changed their attitudes.
6.2. Revolutionary versus evolutionary change
The introduction of ERM-related actions in the theoretical frameworkhelped to trace change pathways, including theway
capital allocation routines changed throughout the company, which is manifested in the reproduction phase of the change
process. Such changes occurred subsequent to the introduction of ERM rules (process oriented decision) at different timings
and were incorporated into new routines. This change is consistent with the survey ﬁndings of AON (2010). The changes
introduced by ERM to capital allocation practices can be classiﬁed as being evolutionary because of the special circumstances
of the insurance context although the previous exposure to riskmanagement information had been very limited. It was often
found that more extensive changes to capital allocation routines have occurred in a company with well-developed ERM,
which implies that the change took place at different intervals, and capital allocation routines changed later on in the process
as compared to the other risk management practices (e.g. communications). ERM has become a tool to provide information
and guidance for seniormanagement aswell as offering lessons to RMswho are seeking tomake an enhanced contribution to
the success of their company (Woods, 2011). A new risk-management-inﬂuenced organisational realitywas created through
providing completely new tools for underwriters and new risk categories to embed in the process of capital allocation. Thus,
existing capital allocation practices were not reﬁned but completely changed.
New risk categories were embedded into the capital model, in particular reputation risk, which is considered as a main
driver for business value. Thus, a key aspect of risk management should be preserving a company’s reputation and it is
evident that it affects customers’ buying decisions, employee loyalty, and investor choices. A good reputation also protects a
company’s competitive position (Woods, 2011). In the Economist Intelligence Unit’s survey of senior executives, reputation
risk was ranked at the top, but was found particularly difﬁcult to manage by senior executives (EIU, 2005). Reputation is a
valued asset; however, it could be argued it is not a separate category of risk, but rather reﬂects a failure to manage other
risks. For example, the underwriting and actuarial departments began to investigate how they could improve their risk
inputs in the process of allocating capital and to present their work to the riskmanagement department. This illustrates how
ERM requirements resulted in re-engineering the business process. Therewas a general awareness that a newunderstanding
of the capital processes was promoted by ERM implementation. The implications of ERM went beyond the capital team;
they extended throughout thewhole company. For example, by collecting risk data from risk sponsors and their teams, ERM
showed that processes should change for everyonewith risk responsibility across the whole company. This is due to the fact
that risk might exist in different departments.
Therefore, the day-to-day risk management practices were re-shaped to a large extent by routines. Risk management
routines in turn affected the ERM rules because the established routines were formalised in new rules, i.e. risk-based cap-
ital allocation. As such, ERM rules and risk management routines are not related in a unidirectional way, and hence ERM
can shape and be shaped by the institutions governing insurance companies, which is consistent with Burns and Scapens
(2000). Organisational resistance in the enactment processes of rules and routines inﬂuenced the extent and type of change.
However, the efforts of the CRO and his team, as well as having ERM implemented and embedded in an evolutionary
structured way, offered a risk culture that facilitated the acceptance of ERM. People across the company have realised the
importance of embedding ERM into their day-to-day activities and hence have started to think in a consistent way with
ERM.
6.3. Progressive versus regressive change
By suggesting a continuous embedding of ERM rules and routines into lower levels and compulsory training until all staff
understand ERM and its related responsibilities, there is evidence that such change is progressive rather than regressive.
This is evident in the institutionalisation of capital allocation routines at VC level. The new routines were instrumental in
decreasing the distance of power between management and employees. Risk-based routines were implemented in lower
levels, and everybody was getting involved and took on risk responsibilities Underwriters were the key users of capital and
had to set the related risk appetite. Theoretically, all the people across the company should use ERM. However, underwrit-
ing risk composes 60 per cent of VC’s risk and drives its capital necessity. Thus, underwriters were seen to be the main
users of ERM. Risk-based capital allocation routines were embedded into underwriters’ daily work because they needed to
understand that the individual decisions they take have a wider implication for the business. They also provided a broader
understanding behindwhat underwriters were trying to achieve. Therefore, risk-based routines form a part of underwriters’
day-to-day jobs.
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ERM formalisation tended to routinise and institutionalise the new risk management routines and institutions. The new
nd ongoing risk management routines embedded meanings, norms, and powers, which facilitated their institutionalisa-
ion. For example, risk has become a major input driving the process of capital allocation, whereby a risk-based capital
llocation method has become the norm in VC. As such, powers related to capital allocation routines and decisions were
hared by staff in risk, underwriting, and actuarial departments. These new risk management routines were shaped by the
revailing institutions governing the insurance companies and, over time, they were institutionalised. It is evident that
he risk management routines were institutionalised instrumentally because the new routines helped to make informed
ecisions. For example, our case study showed that introducing ERM rules led to changes in capital allocation routines
nd institutionalised the new risk management routines as a path dependent process. Further, ERM was embedded into
ll critical decisions in the company, and risk-based capital allocation became the key for making decisions. Following
RM embedding, VC took actions to improve its risk reporting structure. In particular, actions related to improving risk
ommunication within risk reporting structure help ﬁrms to achieve a consistent and appropriate risk response. By taking
his approach, risk management activities fully support the achievement of the strategic objectives of the ﬁrm (Woods,
011).
The ERM system contributed directly, through the new software, and indirectly, through strategy settings, to the intra-
nstitutionalisation of capital allocation routines. It partially disassociated old capital allocation routines from their historical
ircumstances. Further, ERM is argued to be a practice which oscillates between IT-based representations and social inter-
retations andwhich produces circulation andmovement (Tekathen&Dechow, 2013). The CRO and his team can nowaccess
eal-time risk information to check the availability of resources and analyse their portfolio. ‘At the root of ERM is the idea that
isk management is embedded right across the organisation, and consequently is the responsibility of everyone. Specialist
xperts have their place but they need support from operational staff’ (Woods, 2011, p. 41).
AlthoughERMintroducedorganisational changes that areevolutionaryandsocially reproduced through thenewrules and
outines, there was also evidence of regressive change (Burns & Scapens, 2000). And, although there was an inward-looking
ysteminwhich ‘norms’were setbyexperts, ERMpotentially enabledamoreoutward lookingapproach that trackedbusiness
rocesses across the company and into the external competitive environment. Thus, therewas tendency towards employing
he full strategic potential of ERM. This could be attributed to the ability of VC to see the beneﬁts of ERM implementation.
lthough therewas an understanding of the strategic implications of holistic sound riskmanagement system, therewas still
ome uncertainty about the strategic possibilities. By deﬁning risk, staff’s behaviour was being determined by risks, which
ere used as information for decision-making.
Although it could be argued that ERM implementation can be a symbolic embrace of the latest risk management system,
he subsequent understanding of ERM rules and routines can be interpreted as evidence of instrumental rather than cere-
onial change. As illustrated by Giddens (1984), social control is a dialectical process and even seemingly weak actors may
e able to exploit local advantages, such as information asymmetries, in their struggles with powerful actors, such as senior
anagement. It can be argued that it is often difﬁcult to determine the instrumental impact of a new riskmanagement tech-
ique like ERM. However, ﬁnding out that it has been used to inform capital allocation decisions (risk-based and strategic)
rovides a clear evidence of an instrumental effect of ERM.
.4. Concluding remarks
This study is aimed at understanding the changes in capital allocation routines following the introduction of ERM rules.
nterviews with staff at different levels in VC and documentary evidence were the main sources of data for this study. The
tudy provided a view of risk management at an important time for the insurance industry. Economic capital allocation has
ecome themain base of the ERM era, and it allows the strategic shift in ﬁnancial institutions to shareholders’ value creation
Rao & Dev, 2006). It requires understanding and modelling of various types of risk that are borne by a ﬁnancial company.
t is argued that the outcome of this process is a higher return on capital with less risk taken.
This study contributes to debates in the existing literature. It offers an understanding of the change processes in capital
llocation practices associated with ERM implementation. Understanding when andwhy various actors trigger and respond
o different processual mechanisms within the organisational environment can facilitate the change processes in capital
llocation practices in the companies implementing/moving towards ERM. As such, we addressed three research questions
s follows:
The ﬁrst and second research questions focused on the extent of change in the relative roles of institutionalised riskman-
gement practices and to assess the organisational impact of ERM as a new risk management system. Overall, the ﬁndings
ndicate that ERM initiated a change in capital allocation rules (and routines)where ERMwas successfully implemented6 and
s at amature level. It led to embedding different types of risks in the capital allocation process considering their interrelated
mpact on capital decisions. ERM was the main institutional force behind introducing such changes. The institutionalisation
rocess involved a dissociation of risk management routines from their historical circumstances. For instance, while ERM
id not support the existing capital allocation routines in VC, it institutionalised the new capital allocation routines; namely,
6 Success here describes the implementation process itself, which refers to a well-developed and full implementation of ERM related processes at all
evels of the company. In this regard, ERM processes are embedded into decisions at different levels in the company.
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risk-based capital allocation (a path dependent process). Capital allocation routines were expected to institutionalise after
moving to risk-based capital allocation and little further change is anticipated. Further, the risk reporting structure was
enhanced after ERM embedding. Such intentions and changes facilitated the implementation of ERM and the institutio-
nalisation of risk management routines. Thus, the new risk management rules and routines became the way processes
are executed, i.e. institutions. These institutions were encoded into the on-going risk management rules and routines and
formed new rules. The case company has becomemore capital oriented, and risk-based capital allocation routines have been
embedded into different functions.
To address the third research question, we explored the interplay between the impacts of both ERM and the consequent
change and change agents’ actions via analysing the organisational routines. The ﬁndings showed that the new riskmanage-
ment institutions established different meanings, norms, values, and powers of different actors. For example, a risk function
was created following ERM implementation and expanded over time, which shaped the institutionalisation of capital alloca-
tion routines. The roles and responsibilities of people across the company have changed as a result of adding particular and
clearly articulated risk responsibilities to them. The capital allocation routines were shown in this study to be programmatic
rule-based behaviours which explain the way in which new risk management rules became institutions over time.
This study further gives insights on how ERM can be a powerful management tool in the light of its ability to offer
companies rewards from better capital allocation decisions. The use of institutional theory to explicate the change process
in this study is another contribution. Although risk management systems are known to be associated with changes at the
institutional level, institutional theorists have not explored the change processes in the risk management context. Further,
examining the institutional change aspects within the risk management context extends prior research through developing
a processual view of change that provided a better explanation of the change process, which adds to the risk management
and hence management accounting literature.
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Appendix A. Capital allocation methods
Regulatory risk-based capital or regulatory guidelines
• It is used to specify the minimum capital a company must hold to satisfy regulatory standards (Cummins, 2000).
• This method is simple and helps companies to recognise how regulators view their capital adequacy.
• It applies only to assets, addresses risk only and bears little resemblance to reality (Weiner, 1998).
• However, regulatory charges do not consider key risk sources such as interest rate risk, and the transactions of insurer’s
transactions in the derivatives market (Cummins, 2000).
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
• It involves using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
• Itsusagehelpsmanagers tocomparebetween thepreferredmethodand the results that aregeneratedbyaclassic technique
(Cummins, 2000).
Value at risk (VaR)
• It is the amount the company may lose with a speciﬁed small probability in a speciﬁed period of time.
• VaR is likely to be useful to insurers and is related to the concepts of time-honoured insurance and actuarial such as the
maximum probable loss.
• However, the application of sophisticated VaR techniques requires very frequent data updates, but the prices and losses
of insurers are not observed either with sufﬁcient frequency or in a market context.
• Using VaR needs an integration of the capital allocation methodology with data processing and information systems.
• Such integration helps ensuring that relevant and valuable data is generated to offer inputs for VaR models (Cummins,
2000).Marginal capital allocation
• It is applied to techniques proposed by Merton and Perold (1993) and Myers and Read (1999).
• These techniques are based on the ﬁrm option pricing model.
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The ﬁrm options view states that the value of the policyholders’ claim on the ﬁrm is equal to the present value of losses
minus the value of the insolvency put option (Cummins, 2000).
Percentage of average assets
It is the simplest approach to allocate capital which uses the same ratio for all units, products, and customers.
Either the institution’s actual capital ratio or a targeted capital ratio can be used.
Thismethod is easy to apply and can be used to translate the requirements of company’s overall regulatory capital speciﬁed
to individual units, products, and customers.
However, it does not distinguish between the risk various levels, capital investment, or growth. Different ﬁxed assets levels
should also require different capital levels. Units, products, and customers, which are growing faster, require extra amount
of capital because of the step-ﬁxed nature of most ﬁnancial institutions costs (Weiner, 1998).
The top-down
It breaks thecapitaldown into its componentsbasedonall units, products, andcustomersapplicable toa speciﬁc institution.
It provides variability to the process of capital-allocation and communicates organisational priorities for the employment
and use of capital.
There are some difﬁculties associated with this method arising from two factors: (1) Firstly, some managers will arbitrary
perceive and prioritise the components; (2) an institution still has to choose amethod for allocating each component after
deﬁning and prioritising them (Weiner, 1998).
The relative-ranking
It starts with deﬁning and prioritising capital components, similar to the top-down method.
Then it applies a measure of perceived relative risk to each source of risk.
This method is somewhat arbitrary similar to the top-downmethod, but it helps to accomplish the capital allocationmain
goal (Weiner, 1998).
The market comparables
It looks at the capitalisation of other companies that are engaged in the same line of business.
This method provides an objective, external view of capital allocations. It can be used for any line of business, product, or
customer.
But, it is sometimes difﬁcult to ﬁnd exactly comparable businesses and this business might not be capitalised in an
equivalent way. Deriving appropriate capital ratios for certain parts of a ﬁnancial corporation depending on stand-alone
businesses ignores the portfolio effect that reduces the capital which is required for two complementary lines of business
(Weiner, 1998).
Risk adjusted return on capital (RAROC)
It was developed by large ﬁnancial institutions as a common risk language and quantitative technique.
RAROC is an approach used by practitioners to allocate risk capital to business units and individual transactions with the
objective of measuring economic performance. An obvious trade-off between risk and reward for a capital unit is made by
this approach.
Senior managers are enabled by the RAROC information to better understand where shareholders’ value is being created
or destroyed (Crouhy et al., 2006).
It assists strategic planning, risk-adjusted proﬁtability reporting, proactive resources allocation, better concentration risk
management, and better product pricing (Crouhy et al., 2006).
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Appendix B. List of interviewees
Interviewee Code
Chief Risk Ofﬁcer CRO
Chief Underwriting Ofﬁcer CUO
Chief Underwriting Europe CUE
Chief Actuary CAc
Operations Manager OM
Chief Accountant CA
Actuarial Analyst 1 AA/1
Risk Manager, 1 RM/1
Chief Financial Ofﬁcer CFO
Actuarial Analyst 2 AA/2
Risk Manager, 2 RM/2
Chief Operating Ofﬁcer COO
Executive Operations Ofﬁcer EOO
Management Accountant MA
Senior Corporate Underwriter SCU
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